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We explore the intriguing effects of underlying star topological structure, i.e., achieving a global optimization
via a star spatial topology, in Schelling’s segregation model. The significant consequences exerted by the star
topology are both theoretically analysed and numerically simulated with and without introducing a fraction of
altruistic agents, respectively. The collective utility of the model with pure egoists alone can be optimized and
the optimum stationary state is achieved with the underlying star topology. More surprisingly, once a proportion
of altruists are introduced, the average utility gradually decreases as altruists’ fraction increases. This presents
a sharp contrast to the results in usual Schelling’s model with lattice topology.
PACS numbers:
The social structures (even behaviors) share some common
features with a variety of physical systems. The collective or-
der might emerge from simple and local social rules based on
their expectations and/or decisions among individuals. Given
the success and generality of conceptual framework of statis-
tical physics [1], the interest of applying the methodology of
statistical physics to interdisciplinary fields such as social and
economics phenomena (see e.g., [2–4] and references therein)
has grown rapidly in recent years.
Schelling’s social segregation model is probably the most
celebrated example in social-economics sciences [5]. It has
kept attracting attention and inspiring variant models, rang-
ing from social sciences [6–8], economics [9–11], to mathe-
matics [12–14], and statistical physics [15–22]. The segrega-
tion phase transition discovered in the model was proved to be
robust in the sense that similar outcomes occurred in variant
models, even when the utility function is non-monotonic with
the fraction of similar neighbors, or the different underlying
topological structures, such as lattice, random graphs, or frac-
tal were used [9]. However, an important observation is that,
in the Schelling’s model, individual agent moves to update her
own utility, irrespective of the neighbors’ state. Hence it can
not realize collective optimization without nontrivial changes.
An exception, to the author’s knowledge, is [22]. There a gi-
ant catalytic effect was found when a small fraction of altruists
were introduced. This fraction characterizes the continuous
variation of the number of altruistic agents.
In current Rapid Communication, we demonstrate how a
specifically designed star spatial topology in the Schelling’s
model can achieve some novel and counter intuitive effects.
Our theoretical analysis shows that the star spatial topology
alone optimizes the collective utility function and drives the
system into the social optimum state, without introducing any
fraction of altruists to coordinate with dominated egoists (see,
e.g., [22]). The numerical simulations confirm our predic-
tions.
Consider a total number of N agents living in a city with
star topology. From social-economical perspective, the star
topology can be visualized as a mono-centric city with some
satellite blocks (e.g., a central business district can be the hub
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and all agents from different blocks commute there). Note that
the peripheral blocks are all connected with the central hub but
no links between one another. The city is homogeneously di-
vided into Q 1 non-overlapping blocks, and each block into
H sites with the capacity of a maximum H agents. Initially,
a N = QHρ0 agents are randomly distributed over the blocks,
the initial average block density is ρ0, and in general ρ0 < 1/2.
One has to know the specific form of the utility function in or-
der to obtain the equilibrium configurations. We assign all
agents the same utility function u(ρ), which depends on the
agents density ρ of the block they live in. It takes a symmetric
triangular form:
u(ρ) =
{
2ρ, if ρ≤ 0.5,
2(1−ρ), otherwise. (1)
One defines the collective utility U as the sum of all agents’
utilities,
U = H
Q
∑
q=1
ρqu(ρq) , (2)
and the average utility per agent is simply 〈u〉 = U/N. The
density of agents in the q-th block is ρq= nq/H (q= 1, · · · , Q).
We already assumed that each site contain at most one agent,
so that the number of agents in the q-th block, nq, satisfies
nq ≤ H. The utility u(ρq) that each agent shares describes the
degree of satisfaction concerning the density of the block the
agent is located.
According to the spirit of Schelling’s model one can intro-
duce two types of agents: “egoists” and “altruists” depending
on one’s need. The former (egoist) acts to improve her/his
individual utility, and the latter (altruist) to improve the col-
lective utility. Egoists consider variation of their individual
utility ∆u, while altruists consider the variation of the global
utility ∆U . At each time step, one randomly selects an agent
and a vacant site in another connected block. The agent ac-
cepts to move to this new site only if its objective function
strictly increases, and the moving agent is taken into account
to compute the density of the new block. Otherwise, it stays in
its present block. Then, another agent and another empty site
are chosen at random, and the same process repeat until a sta-
tionary state is reached, in which there are no possible moves
for any agent. In general, one can apply or extend the frame-
work of equilibrium statistical mechanics to the Schelling’s
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2model in order to find the stationary probability distribution
for the microscopic configurations [23]. However, from an
individualistic point of view, one has to resort to numerical
simulations in order to obtain general solutions.
One of the most intriguing results of the star topology in
Schelling’s model is that an optimum stationary state can
be obtained with egoists alone. To see how the system ap-
proaches its optimum stationary state, it is necessary to ad-
dress the evolutionary dynamics of Schelling’s model with
given star topology.
Initially, there are N ≡ ρ0QH egoists randomly distributed
over all blocks. An initial total average density of the agents
ρ0 = 0.4 is taken throughout the paper. The relaxation process
to the stationary state can be divided into the following three
stages:
(1) at first, egoists from peripheral blocks immigrate to the
hub block gradually, as long as the utility of the hub uhub(ρhub)
is not the lowest one at the very beginning. Without losing
generality, suppose that there are Ql > 0 blocks of which util-
ities ul(ρl > 0) are lower than that of the hub block. The
inflow rate of the agents to the hub, Pin =Ql/Q, is larger than
the outflow rate Pout = (Q−1−Ql)/(Q(Q−1)) of the agents,
given that the probability for an arbitrary block in the topology
to be chosen is 1/Q. With the increasing of the hub density
ρhub through the aggregation of agents, the utility uhub(ρhub)
is optimized at first when ρhub < 1/2 and turn to decreased
when ρhub > 1/2;
(2) Similar to uhub, as ρhub increases and approaches to 1/2
(i.e. ρhub↗ 1/2), Ql → Q− 1, and then decreases gradually
until Ql = 1. This procedure dominates the global dynamical
process, and can be approximately considered as Schelling’s
model with only two blocks and pure egoists. In this case
the statistical physics method can be directly applied [22].
Accordingly, the egoists tend to maximize a global parame-
ter “effective free energy” L which is defined as L = ∑q lq,
where lq is the free energy of the q-th block, and can be
approximately written as lq(ρq) ≈ H
∫ ρq
0 u(ρ)dρ, for block
q = 1,2, · · · ,Q in the large H  1 limit. Depending on the
initial density ρ0, the optimization requirement of L in a two
blocks system leads to two kinds of different phases, one for
the average density ρ¯≤ 1/2 where the egoists totally gathered
at one block and leaving another empty, the other for ρ¯> 1/2
where the egoists equally distributed over both blocks. Re-
call that the initial total average density ρ0 < 1/2 is taken, and
only the remaining blocks with ul(ρl < 1/2)< uhub(ρ> 1/2)
will be exhausted and the hub eventually extracts all ego-
ists from them. After this node-pair effect stage that leads
to Ql = 0, hence Pin = 0, the egoists gathered at hub block
start to equally hop to non-empty peripheral blocks. The
utilities u(ρq > 0) of these blocks, including uhub(ρhub), in-
crease again, and are accompanied with the quickly decreas-
ing of ρhub > 1/2 and slowly increasing of ρ in other blocks
with u(0 < ρ < 1/2). Once other peripheral blocks with
ul(ρl < 1/2) < uhub(ρ > 1/2) reappeared, i.e. Ql = 1, the
node-pair effect occurs again and takes the leading role in
global dynamics. Through such reoccurrences during the evo-
lution, the hub persistently relocates the egoists from an ar-
bitrary peripheral block with ul(ρl < 1/2) < uhub(ρ > 1/2)
to other peripheral blocks with ρ > 0, whose utilities will be
improved continuously;
(3) The prevalence of the same node-pair effect will last un-
til ρ ≥ 1/2 is achieved for each occupied peripheral blocks.
This suggests ρ¯ & 1/2 for all remaining ρ > 0 peripheral
blocks. Therefore, existing blocks will no longer be ex-
hausted, since the phase for ρ¯ & 1/2 takes over the node-pair
effect, and results in an equally distribution of egoists over
the remaining blocks. Finally, a stationary state is approached
with an optimized average utility 〈u(ρ& 1/2)〉. 1.
On the other hand, in contrast to the pure egoists’ case, the
behavior of altruists can lead to a totally different, more sur-
prising phase, where a stationary state with lower 〈u〉 will be
achieved. Since their target function is to improve the collec-
tive utility U = ∑u, the altruists from peripheral sites cannot
optimize U by freely hopping to other sites, but only judge
whether moving to the hub. However, the density of the hub
ρhub > 1/2 always remains the largest one during the evolu-
tion, as long as it is not too small in initial stage. Thus for
altruists the only way moving out peripheral sites is prohib-
ited by the high density of the hub, otherwise the total utility
U would be lowered down. Hence for the case of pure altru-
ists (i.e. p= 1), almost all agents will stay at their initial sites
without any moves, except the initial aggregation to the hub
block until ρhub = 1/2 is reached.
For general coexistence case, e.g., p= 0.5, the egoists keep
moving and optimizing their own utilities u and ultimately op-
timize of the collective utilityU . At the same time, prohibited
by the high density of ρhub > 1/2, most altruists from periph-
eral blocks have to stay at their initial sites and can not im-
prove the collective utility U . Recall that the density of the
hub ρhub > 1/2 always remain the largest one during most
time of the evolution, as a result, the rest altruists located at
the hub initially would escape from the hub and randomly mi-
grate to any other peripheral blocks.
We demonstrate the above scenario of dynamical evolution
in Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Fig. 3 with fixed H = 200 and Q = 50,
but different altruist’s fractions p = 0, p = 0.5, and p = 1 re-
spectively. In Fig. 1, we show the evolution of agents’ density
ρq (upper panel), and utility uq (lower panel), of the q-th block
of star spatial topology with an altruists’ fraction p= 0. Each
one of the curves represent a ρq(upper panel) and a uq (lower
panel) of a q-th block. Note that with the dropping of each
ρl (or ul), displayed by those curves which sharp declining
to zero, ρhub (the green bold line in the upper panel) increase
while uhub (the green bold line in the lower panel) decrease un-
til ρl → 0 (or ul → 0). On the contrary, ρhub decreases while
uhub increases until the appearance of another ρl (or ul). The
process repeats until all ρq > 0 converge gradually to a value
slightly larger than 0.5, and all uq > 0 almost approach unity
finally.
The similar process occurs in Fig. 2, except for p = 0.5.
One significant difference comparing to Fig. 1 can be ob-
served: almost all ρl (or ul) would not get down to zero since
the altruists still stay at those blocks. Dragging down by these
small but nonzero ul’s, the average utility 〈u〉 is inversely pro-
portional to the altruists’ fraction p.
Likewise, the process with p= 1 is plotted in Fig. 3. Almost
3all agents will stay at their initial site without any moves, ex-
cept the initial aggregation to the hub block until ρhub = 1/2
is reached, which means the average utility 〈u〉 is not opti-
mized at all (see the green dashed lines in upper panel for ρq
in Fig. 3).
FIG. 1: Evolution of agents’ density ρq (upper panel), and utility uq
(lower panel), of the q-th block of star spatial topology with H = 200
and Q = 50. Note that an altruists’ fraction p = 0 is taken in the
simulation, which means without any altruists being introduced. The
bold green line represents the evolution of hub’s density ρhub (upper
panel) and utility uhub (lower panel), respectively. A horizontal blue
dotted line in the upper panel at ρq = 0.5 is for eye guidance.
Based on the theoretical analysis and numerical simula-
tions for evolutionary dynamics above, the optimum station-
ary state as a function of altruists’ fraction p can be calcu-
lated directly The analytical results of the optimized station-
ary state for p = 0 case can be obtained from a recurrence
relation ρn = ρn−1 + ρn−1/(Q− n), where ρn represents the
average density of occupied blocks when there are n empty
blocks. Given that ρ1 = ρ0 +ρ0/(Q− 1), the density of oc-
cupied blocks (i.e., n∗ empty blocks) at stationary state is ap-
proximately
ρn∗ ≈ ρ0
(
1+
1
Q−1
)(
1+
1
Q−2
)
. . .
(
1+
1
Q−n∗
)
,
= ρ0
( Q
Q−n∗
)
. (3)
Recall that when ρ ≥ 1/2 is satisfied for all occupied blocks,
the node-pair effect disappears. For optimum stationary state,
Eq.(3) can be written as
ρn∗ = ρ0
( Q
Q−n∗
)
=
1
2
+ ε , (4)
FIG. 2: Similar to Fig. 1, but with an altruists’ fraction p= 0.5.
FIG. 3: Similar to Fig. 1, but with an altruists’ fraction p= 1.
where ε is a small quantity induced by fluctuation. Obvi-
ously, the number of occupied blocks at stationary state sat-
isfy Q− n∗ = Int[2ρ0Q− ε], where Int[· · · ] represents the
maximum integer of [· · · ], and hence the analytical results of
4density ρn∗ = 1/2+ ε. The collective utility is then 〈u〉 =
2(1−ρn∗) for the optimum stationary state.
In coexistence situation 0 < p < 1 in stationary state, the
hub block is occupied by egoists and low density blocks by
altruists only, the optimized peripheral blocks are occupied
by both egoists and altruists. One expects that the average
utility 〈u(p)〉 (and the total utility U) may decrease as p in-
creases. In the limit of pure altruists’ case p = 1, since the
hardly moving appearance of altruists in star topology, the sta-
tionary density of each peripheral block ρq would thus almost
keep unchanged in the Q→ ∞ limit. It is easy to found that
∑Q−1q=1 ρq ≈ Qρ0, hence the average utility 〈u〉 ' u(ρ0) holds
for all peripheral sites.
The numerical simulations fully confirms our analysis. In
Fig. 4, we show the average utility 〈u(p)〉 versus the parame-
ter p for different number of blocks, Q = 100, Q = 200, and
Q= 400, respectively. For simplicity, throughout our numeri-
cal simulations, we fix the parameters H = 200 and ρ0 = 0.4.
We have three observations from the figure, as expected from
theoretical analysis: (1) the system approaches its optimum
state even without introducing any altruists (see the left most
p = 0). Note that it is impossible to emerge such an opti-
mum state in Schelling’s model on a lattice city with pure
egoists [22]; (2) indeed, the average utility 〈u(p)〉 (and/or the
total utility U) decreases linearly as the altruists’ fraction p
increases, and this is also a surprising consequence since in
[22], an infinitesimal small fraction p ∼ 1/Q can drive the
system into the optimum state abruptly. Increasing the frac-
tion p will not change the situation; and (3) the average utility
〈u〉 is independent of the number of blocks Q, and computed
collective utility data for Q= 100, 200, and 400 collapse onto
the the same curve nicely.
FIG. 4: The average utility function 〈u〉 as a function of the altruists’
fraction p with H = 200, and Q= 100 (blue open squares), Q= 200
(red open triangles), and Q= 400 (green open circles), respectively.
The proposed star topology as a limiting scenario can probe
the limits of the effects, i.e., under what range and features
of topologies will they work. For more general underlying
topologies consisted of a core network of which topology is
arbitrary, and a finite proportion of peripheral blocks (each
block has only one link), similar effects occur provided that
the proportion of peripheral blocks is big enough. We simu-
lated the cases with the core network to be full-connected net-
work, random graph and one dimensional loop, respectively,
the down trend of the average utility function does not change.
This is again due to the microscopic node-pair effect between
the peripheral blocks and the core network.
Although it has been almost fifty years since the famous
Schelling’s model was proposed, it still inspires new ideas
and/or variant models in, but not limited to, social-economics
and/or statistical physics. It is worth to notice that the
Schelling’s model and most of its variants did not realize
collective optimization with underlying lattice topology, and
the possible consequences by underlying complex topologies
seem to have been overlooked.
In this Rapid Communication, for the first time, a collective
optimization was achieved via implementing an underlying
star topology in Schelling’s model. The theoretical analysis
of the corresponding roles played by underlying star topology
(and its hub) in evolutionary dynamics and optimum station-
ary state was developed. It was discovered that even with pure
egoists (p = 0), the collective utility of the model can be op-
timized, and the system tends to an optimum stationary state.
Physically, this means for pure egoists, an underlying spatial
topology formed by these agents may help them reach an op-
timum stationary state. We emphasize that this is a purely
spatial topological effect in Schelling’s model.
A more surprising result is that once a proportion of altru-
ists, i.e., p 6= 0, are introduced in Schelling’s model with star
topology, the optimization of the collective utility decreases
as the altruists’ fraction p increases. In other words, introduc-
ing more and more altruistic agents does not help the system
approaching its optimal state. This forms a sharp contrast to
one of previous studies [22], in which an infinitesimal frac-
tion of altruists p ∼ 1/Q produces a dramatic catalytic effect
and drives the system to the optimal steady state. The nu-
merical simulations for evolutionary dynamics in Schelling’s
model with p = 0, p = 0.5, and p = 1 respectively, were ful-
filled, and fully support our theoretical analysis. Similar ef-
fects occur for broader classes of underlying topologies con-
sisted of a core network and a finite proportion of peripheral
blocks, provided that the proportion is large enough. The
social-economic meanings of our study are still waiting for
a sufficient understanding, for instance, whether or not this
provide some new perspectives on the origin of human coop-
erations remains to be answered.
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